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Fissile Materials Working Group

Fissile Materials Working Group

The Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG) brings together the experience of leading nonproliferation experts and nongovernmental organizations to support President Barack Obama's vision of "securing all nuclear weapon materials at vulnerable sites within four years." Specifically, working group members collaborate in a series of meetings to create consensus around fissile material control priorities, develop actionable policy proposals, and package recommendations for implementation by Obama administration officials. FMWG members who will contribute to this column include Irma Arguello, David Culp, Ingrid Drake, Rob Golan-Vilella, Li Hong, Kenneth Luongo, Michelle Cann, Rajiv Nayan, Miles Pomper, William Potter, Kingston Reif, Jennifer Smyser, Elena Sokova, Peter Stockton, Alexandra Toma, Paul Walker, Peter Wilk, and Sarah Williams.

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Articles by Fissile Materials Working Group

Columnists
2 October 2012
Nuclear Energy

Security at Y-12 nun too good

Fissile Materials Working Group

In the early hours of July 28, Megan Rice, the now-famous 82-year-old nun and activist, and her accomplices -- Greg Boertje-Obed, a 57-year-old housepainter and veteran, and Michael Walli, a 63-year-old gardener -- broke into the Fort Knox of nuclear facilities: the Y-12 National Security Complex, which houses 300 to 400 metric tons of bomb-grade uranium. The three activists knew they were risking their lives by breaking into the facility; the guards at Y-12 are sanctioned to use deadly force on trespassers.

Columnists
30 August 2012

The oversight imperative

Fissile Materials Working Group

The prevention of nuclear terrorism, one of the foremost international security threats that we face today, relies on separate national regulations with little oversight. There are few international checks and balances on the physical protection of the treacherous material, which could be used to create nuclear devices by terrorists, aside from bilateral agreements and individual treaties formed at the will of individual states. This lack of binding guidelines and international oversight of nuclear security is inadequate for today's nuclear risks.

Columnists
12 July 2012
Nuclear Weapons

Australia's nuclear dilemma

Fissile Materials Working Group

"What will make a focus on nuclear security a permanent feature of what we do?" asked Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard at the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit held in Seoul in late March. Experts agree that the 2014 summit must go further in securing nuclear materials from disasters and, most important, terrorist threats -- but agreement on precisely how to do this is harder to come by. In this regard, Australia has much to offer.

Columnists
12 June 2012
Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear security's top priority

Fissile Materials Working Group

In the past two decades, at least two terrorist groups have made serious attempts at obtaining nuclear weapons or the nuclear material needed to make them. They won't be the last. Foiling terrorists willing to inflict unlimited damage requires the international community to prioritize the nuclear stocks that pose the greatest risks and take immediate steps to eliminate or secure them.

Columnists
25 April 2012
Nuclear Weapons

Could less be more?

Fissile Materials Working Group

The outcome of the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit left a lot to be desired, and much remains to be done to minimize the nuclear and radiological terrorism risk.

Columnists
15 March 2012
Nuclear Weapons

Seoul purpose

Fissile Materials Working Group

In April 2010, representatives from 47 countries and three international organizations gathered in Washington, DC, for the first Nuclear Security Summit, an international effort created to strengthen fissile material security measures and prevent nuclear terrorism. Leaders endorsed the summit's objective of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in four years and signed consensus communiqué and work plan documents focused on compliance with today's nuclear material security regime.

Columnists
16 February 2012
Nuclear Weapons

Why Latin America matters at the Nuclear Security Summit

Fissile Materials Working Group

It is a fact that nuclear terrorism is a global threat and has become a worldwide concern. But what is particularly frightening is that there is no clearly defined plan for securing all nuclear materials. According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative's (NTI) Nuclear Material Security Index, there is no global consensus about what steps matter most in achieving nuclear security.

Columnists
26 January 2012
Nuclear Weapons

Involuntary response

Fissile Materials Working Group

Earlier this month, widespread inaction on the increasing dangers posed by nuclear proliferation and climate change forced the Bulletin's Doomsday Clock to move one minute closer to midnight, indicating the mounting perils confronting humanity's survival. One factor pushing the clock forward to five minutes to midnight was the failure to ensure strict security and comprehensive international oversight for nuclear weapons and materials, which continue to accumulate in a few nations.

Columnists
21 December 2011
Nuclear Weapons

Radiological materials and the Nuclear Security Summit

Fissile Materials Working Group

With the second Nuclear Security Summit fast approaching, it is a good moment to reflect on one of the new issues with which the Seoul summit will attempt to grapple: radiological security. The first Nuclear Security Summit in Washington focused on weapons-usable nuclear materials -- highly enriched uranium and plutonium. The rationale behind a strictly defined agenda was to attract attention to the materials that pose the gravest dangers, as they can be used in a nuclear weapon.

Columnists
30 November 2011
Nuclear Weapons

Why the Conference on Disarmament still matters

Fissile Materials Working Group

It has expanded from 10 member countries to 65, negotiated seven international nonproliferation and disarmament treaties, and next March turns 52 years old. It is the Conference on Disarmament (CD) -- the world's only disarmament negotiating forum -- and, for almost 16 years, it has stagnated in deadlock. The ongoing stalemate has led some to question the forum's utility and even to suggest conducting negotiations outside of the multilateral body in order to obtain a treaty to halt the production of fissile materials. This would be a mistake.

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