fissile.jpeg

Fissile Materials Working Group

Fissile Materials Working Group

The Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG) brings together the experience of leading nonproliferation experts and nongovernmental organizations to support President Barack Obama's vision of "securing all nuclear weapon materials at vulnerable sites within four years." Specifically, working group members collaborate in a series of meetings to create consensus around fissile material control priorities, develop actionable policy proposals, and package recommendations for implementation by Obama administration officials. FMWG members who will contribute to this column include Irma Arguello, David Culp, Ingrid Drake, Rob Golan-Vilella, Li Hong, Kenneth Luongo, Michelle Cann, Rajiv Nayan, Miles Pomper, William Potter, Kingston Reif, Jennifer Smyser, Elena Sokova, Peter Stockton, Alexandra Toma, Paul Walker, Peter Wilk, and Sarah Williams.

Subscribe

Articles by Fissile Materials Working Group

Columnists
8 April 2010
Nuclear WeaponsNuclear Energy

Strengthening nuclear security: The legal agenda

Fissile Materials Working Group

President Barack Obama's upcoming Nuclear Security Summit has the potential to become a defining moment for international security in the twenty-first century, especially after the recent release of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. When he introduced this document, Obama said, "For the first time, preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism is at the top of America's nuclear agenda."

Columnists
8 April 2010
Nuclear WeaponsNuclear Energy

Deconstructing U.S. funding for nuclear material security

Fissile Materials Working Group

One year ago, President Barack Obama made a bold pledge to "secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world within four years." His immediate follow-through, however, has been wanting. For instance, his fiscal year 2010 budget request to meet this goal was actually $200 million less than what the Bush administration allocated a year earlier for securing nuclear material abroad. In fact, the administration still hasn't defined what it actually considers vulnerable nuclear material. So, in essence, Obama has lost a full calendar year in his four-year quest.

Columnists
1 April 2010
Nuclear WeaponsNuclear Energy

Prioritizing investment in nuclear security education

Fissile Materials Working Group

To a large degree, the implementation of robust nuclear security depends on the availability of qualified and dedicated specialists. Unfortunately, such nuclear security specialists are in short supply and training programs for the next generation are limited as well.

Columnists
1 April 2010
Nuclear WeaponsNuclear Energy

This is the year for nuclear material security

Fissile Materials Working Group

A few weeks ago, an anti-nuclear group breached security fencing at the Kleine Brogel Air Base in Belgium. Undetected, the group spent more than an hour on a military base where U.S. nuclear weapons are supposedly stored. Worse yet, they then uploaded to YouTube a video showing exactly how they exploited Kleine Brogel's security weaknesses.

Replace peace activists with terrorists and the results could be devastating.

Columnists
30 March 2010
Nuclear Weapons

Preventing nuclear terrorism

Fissile Materials Working Group

The television drama 24 is currently portraying one of the most frightening and dangerous terrorist scenarios possible--an anti-American terrorist group with radioactive fissile materials intent on detonating a "dirty bomb" in New York City to render it uninhabitable for decades to come. Jack Bauer, the show's intrepid hero, is trying to track down the terrorists and capture the fissile materials before the terrorists have a chance to blow them up. Although television dramas often engage in hyperbole, the basic theme of this terrorist scenario is very real.

Columnists
30 March 2010
Nuclear WeaponsNuclear Energy

Reduce the civilian use of HEU now

Fissile Materials Working Group

Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is usually regarded as the fissile material most desirable to terrorists, given the relative ease with which it could be used to manufacture a simple nuclear explosive device. For similar reasons, it's also worrisome from a state-level proliferation viewpoint.

Pages