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Malcolm Dando

A biologist, Dando researches international security at the University of Bradford's Department of Peace Studies. His expertise is in chemical and biological weapons, arms control, and biosecurity. An author and contributor to countless books on bioweapons and biotechnology, including The New Biological Weapons: Threat, Proliferation, and Control (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), Dando’s recent interests include how the ongoing revolution in the life sciences might open up possibilities for new forms of biological weapons. Prior to working at the University of Bradford, Dando held a Ministry of Defence funded fellowship in operational research at the University of Sussex. Since 2002, he has travelled extensively, focusing on the in-depth national implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

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Articles by Malcolm Dando

Analysis
27 September 2012
Biosecurity

Getting to bioweapons consensus

Malcolm DandoKathryn NixdorffAlexander Kelle

At the Seventh Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Review Conference in Geneva last December, the treaty's 165 member states agreed to a new intersessional process of work to be done in preparation for the next such conference, in 2016. This new process retained the limited aim ("to discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action") of the previous two intersessional processes, but it did restructure the convention's annual meeting of experts and state parties within the process.

Columnists
9 January 2012
Biosecurity

Biological indecision

Malcolm Dando

The December 2011 Seventh Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in Geneva was widely expected to significantly strengthen international measures in the prohibition regime against weapons of mass destruction. After all, the review came after a series of constructive annual meetings in the second Intersessional Process (ISP) -- the meetings and actions taken throughout the five years between each review conference -- from 2007 to 2010 as well as in a number of meetings held over the last couple of years in different parts of the world.

Columnists
1 December 2011
Biosecurity

Dealing with advances in science at the Seventh BTWC Review Conference

Malcolm Dando

Ahead of the Seventh Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) Review Conference, which will be held December 5-22 in Geneva, Switzerland, the United Nations published 26 advance papers produced by state parties to inspire serious and spirited discussion for the event -- and at least six of these papers focused on how advances in science and technology impact the BTWC and how, in the future, these advances should be considered by the stat

Columnists
1 November 2011
Biosecurity

Educating the life scientists

Malcolm Dando

There are increasing signs that state parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) realize that the lack of biosecurity awareness and education among life scientists represents a serious gap in the overall web of policies designed to prevent bioterrorism and biowarfare. Without such awareness and education, how can practicing life scientists contribute their expertise to the development and implementation of oversight systems and codes of conduct necessary to protect benignly intended work from hostile misuse?

Columnists
18 October 2011
Biosecurity

What the fight against disease can teach the biological weapons community

Malcolm Dando

On September 10, 2011, the London Observer newspaper carried a long, affectionate portrait of former US President Jimmy Carter. The author wrote of Carter's life before, during, and after his presidency -- noting approvingly, for example, that Carter didn't start any wars while in office. But my attention was drawn to some of the work Carter embarked on with the Carter Center after he left office.

Columnists
18 July 2011
Biosecurity

An auspicious moment for the BWC Review Conference?

Malcolm Dando

As I endeavored to write a positive take on the prospects for the upcoming Seventh Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in December, the proverb "There's many a slip 'twixt cup and lip" kept coming to mind. In other words, a lot could still go wrong in December. Perhaps it's the history of the near-death experience of the Convention in the 2001-2002 Fifth Review Conference, or maybe it's the Convention's existence on the intersessional process (ISP) life-support system of 2003-2005 and 2007-2010.

Columnists
13 May 2011
Biosecurity

Science, technology, and the bioweapons treaty

Malcolm Dando

If one listened closely to the discussions around the recent meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the upcoming review of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), one might have heard a distant rumble of concern. These worries stem from the widespread recognition that advances in the life sciences are progressing at a rate faster than the treaty seems able to keep pace with.

Columnists
27 February 2011

Did we make a huge mistake over dual use?

Malcolm Dando

Given the amount of space they occupy in newspapers, I cannot be the only person fascinated by obituaries. I enjoy reading about real people, their accomplishments, and the different worlds they inhabited. This pastime has led to new discoveries for me -- most recently the works of late historian John Burrow.

Columnists
17 January 2011
Biosecurity

More talk, better security: The need for wider debate on strengthening the BWC

Malcolm Dando

There is an old joke that always makes me smile. It goes something like this:

A visitor to Ireland was in Cork and needed to get to Dublin quickly, so he asked a local what the best way to drive was. The answer came back after a short pause for thought: "If I was going to Dublin, I wouldn't start from here."

Columnists
2 December 2010
Biosecurity

Teaching biosecurity

Malcolm Dando

In his keynote address delivered at the International Conference on Science and International Security: Addressing the Challenges of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism in Madrid on November 9, Sen. Richard Lugar, Republican of Indiana, stressed the need to expand the 20-year-old Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, which he and former Sen. Sam Nunn, Democrat of Georgia, developed in 1991 to secure and destroy nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in the former Soviet Union.

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