Press release: The Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists announces the time of the Doomsday Clock.
The Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists move the hand from six minutes to five minutes to midnight.
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists will announce whether or not it is moving the minute hand of its famous Doomsday Clock at 1 p.m. EST/1800 GMT on January 10, 2012 in Washington, DC.
The Science and Security Board and the Governing Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, with participation from the Sponsors, will consider the implications of recent events and trends for the future of humanity at the annual Doomsday Clock Symposium.
Russia has several legitimate concerns with NATO missile defense -- dismissing them is short-sighted and dangerous.
Science and Security Board member Jonathan Tucker was a biosecurity expert whose unique gift was to provide sane, grounded analysis of issues and communicate these in accessible language to policymakers and the public.
Shahrzad Mohtadi, a sophomore at Columbia University in New York City, has been selected for the Bulletin's 2011 Leonard M. Rieser Fellowship.
As the Bulletin's Chair of the Board of Directors from 2005-2009, Cathryn Cronin Cranston helped lead the Bulletin through a major transformation, moving the publication from print to an entirely digital format in 2009.
Award-winning radio and newspaper reporter Laurie Garrett, now a senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations, describes the mistakes and misjudgments made by government officials in response to the anthrax attacks of 2001, and provides recommendations for what should be done now.
The author reviews reassessments undertaken around the world after the 2011 accident in Japan and underlines Europe’s critical role in whether the future of nuclear energy will be global. He also looks at nulcear governance and writes that the politicization of the International Atomic Energy Agency, its limited authority, and the inability of major powers to cooperate effectively as reasons that nuclear governance remains ineffective.
