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In 1945, the United States organized a committee to investigate whether nuclear weapons should become a central military technology, or whether to abjure the weapons and, through self-restraint, avoid a costly and potentially deadly nuclear arms race. Led by Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson and Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority David Lilienthal, the committee produced the eponymous Acheson-Lilienthal Report, which, after it failed to gather reasonable support, marked a turning point in the Cold War and signaled the beginning of the nuclear arms race.

The Chicago NATO Summit accomplished its main goal of finalizing plans to turn over control of the security situation in Afghanistan to the Afghan security forces by the middle of next year. But in fact that goal had already been accomplished well before the meeting.

Both NATO and Russia would like to see the other reduce its stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons, but the two sides have been unable to agree on mutual reductions. Even modest progress on the issue at NATO's Chicago summit seems unlikely. This is partially because it is unclear what a "tactical" nuclear weapon is.

Editor's note: This article is largely drawn from Ramana's featured piece in the report "Assuring Destruction Forever," edited by Ray Acheson and published in April 2012 byReaching Critical Will.

The only visible achievement of the talks between the major powers and Iran in Istanbul in mid-April -- 15 months after the previous round had been pronounced a failure -- was agreement to meet again in Baghdad.

As talks between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany (P5+1) move to Baghdad, leaders and analysts alike are wondering whether diplomacy will be any more successful now than during previous negotiations involving the Obama administration. To answer that question, it is important to understand why the previous talks failed and what is -- or might be -- different now.

A hot mic shouldn't overshadow a dirty bomb. The Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul ended recently with two dominant story lines: President Obama's "hot mic" comments to Russian President Medvedev and the 53 participating governments congratulating themselves on the summit's outcomes. Both miss the key strategic problem that the Seoul Summit did not address: the need to unify the current patchwork, largely voluntary approach to nuclear security that is not commensurate with the risk or consequences of nuclear terrorism.

In talks with the United States late in February, North Korea agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment in a specific facility at Yongbyon and to initiate a moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile tests. When the United States and North Korea made the bilateral "leap-day deal," the suspension of enrichment was rightly hailed as one of the great successes of the arrangement.

This week, world leaders descended on Seoul, South Korea, for the second global Nuclear Security Summit -- a project that started with President Obama's call to secure all vulnerable nuclear material in four years (by the end of 2013). Unfortunately, most of these world leaders did not storm the gates of the summit ready to fight for that deadline. Many walked into a meeting already overshadowed by various domestic agendas and geopolitics, putting a damper on the real purpose of the gathering.

Tens of thousands filled the square as the echoes of the speaker at the podium boomed through huge speakers. Some came in anger, others in grief, but all agreed: It was time for a change.  Many carried banners, others carried drums; some had taken their children out of school to attend.  No, this wasn't Tahrir Square; it was Tokyo, Japan, on a chilly Monday last fall.

For the first time in years, there is some welcome news out of North Korea: Washington and Pyongyang have finally struck a deal. North Korea agreed, for the time being, to issue a moratorium on uranium enrichment as well as nuclear and missile tests, which would help relieve tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Pyongyang vowed to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors into its Yongbyon nuclear facilities to verify the anticipated uranium enrichment freeze.

Increasing oil prices and environmental conscientiousness have generated a commensurate spike in interest in renewable energy sources. Most technologies, however, are ill-suited to providing large-scale, base-load power. Solar, wind, hydroelectric, and geothermal power all rely on specific environmental or geographic conditions that are intermittent or uncommon in nature. Furthermore, the places where these conditions do occur are often far from the population centers where power is needed most.