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At its Lisbon summit in November, NATO is expected to make two important decisions: whether to build its own missile defense system in Europe and whether missile defense should be part of the alliance's core mission. Neither of these proposals has generated much controversy among the alliance members, so we can expect a reasonably strong commitment to missile defense to emerge from the summit.

If the Obama administration wants to set a new, strengthened standard for nuclear cooperation agreements, it must take a counterintuitive decision: relax demands that Jordan forgo uranium enrichment in order to secure a nuclear partnership with Washington.

The recognition of the need for nuclear disarmament and the question of how to achieve it are as old as the nuclear age. In June 1945, before the first nuclear weapon had been built, in what became known as the Franck Report, a group of scientists working on the U.S. atomic bomb program warned that:

Is Myanmar developing nuclear weapons, perhaps with the help of North Korea? That worrisome possibility, prompted by Myanmar's receipt of dual-use technology via an illegal North Korean procurement network, has garnered considerable speculation.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) have evolved in interestingly different ways in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The CWC and its major international organization -- the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons -- have become rather opaque to civil society, despite a significant program of official activities.