Columns | Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Iran: Looking forward

Hugh Gusterson — Tue, 30 Jun 2009 08:01:02 -0700

Ayatollah Khamenei and the Iranian regime had two choices when their blatant rigging of the election was met with massive street protests. They could stand aside, a la the decrepit regimes of Eastern Europe in 1989; or they could send out uniformed thugs to beat, kill, and intimidate the protesters until their movement buckled, a la China's Tiananmen Square strategy.

They chose the latter, and we will all pay the price.

Budgeting for national security

Gordon Adams — Thu, 25 Jun 2009 15:25:14 -0700

When taking into account the costs of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. defense budget has more than doubled since fiscal year 2001. And yet, despite this growth, the appetite for more defense funding has continued unabated, and our security dilemmas appear to grow.

Can the U.S. lead the way on dual-use education?

Malcolm Dando — Tue, 16 Jun 2009 10:35:06 -0700

Since the Second Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1986, States Parties have made suggestions for how to educate life scientists about and raise awareness of the dual-use implications of their benignly intended work. But little truly has been done to engage scientists on the subject.

The problems with the Department of Homeland Security

Laura H. Kahn — Tue, 09 Jun 2009 10:34:19 -0700

In response to 9/11, Congress created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a massive cabinet-level agency that consolidated 22 departments and agencies and almost 200,000 federal employees. Its goal was to improve domestic security coordination and communication.

The CTBT debate begins again

Hugh Gusterson — Mon, 01 Jun 2009 07:25:48 -0700

North Korea's nuclear test on May 25 has increased the urgency of the nuclear test ban cause but also raised further questions about the feasibility of achieving a truly universal ban. President Barack Obama has promised to seek "aggressive" and "immediate" ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Signed by Washington in 1996, the CTBT was brought before the Senate for ratification once before in 1999.

What if North Korea were the only nuclear weapon state?

Pavel Podvig — Wed, 27 May 2009 09:47:07 -0700

North Korea's nuclear test will almost certainly fuel skepticism about the nuclear disarmament agenda. If no country has nuclear weapons, skeptics will ask, then how can “nuclear renegades” such as North Korea be deterred or dissuaded from getting a nuclear weapon and how can they be disarmed if they get one? For most opponents of nuclear abolition this argument ends the debate.

Do U.S. biodefense efforts need systems analysis?

Malcolm Dando — Mon, 18 May 2009 09:12:28 -0700

As a young biologist I was offered a post-doctoral fellowship at the University of Michigan. When I arrived in the United States I considered my previous work on the characteristics of neuronal circuits and decided to examine it in a broader context. This spurred me to begin reading all I could find on systems analysis--the assessment of large, complex events or structures through the examination of their constituents. Although the only writings of systems analysis I found satisfactory were those of Sir Geoffrey Vickers, I could not shake this interest.

Stirring up "swine flu" hysteria

Laura H. Kahn — Mon, 11 May 2009 09:07:03 -0700

All disease crises begin with some level of chaos and confusion, particularly when a novel microbe is involved. The current influenza A (H1N1) crisis--referred to by the media as "swine flu"--isn't an exception. The notable difference is the level of hysteria it inspired.

Saudi Arabia's big bet on innovation and education

Kurt Zenz House — Tue, 05 May 2009 13:54:18 -0700

I am writing this article from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where I have had a most interesting and hopeful week.

Who's in charge during the swine flu crisis?

Laura H. Kahn — Wed, 29 Apr 2009 13:22:18 -0700

As the swine flu crisis worsens, effective disease control will require political and public health leadership at the federal, state, and local levels. Like the deadly influenza virus of 1918 that took more lives than World War I, this latest virus is an H1N1 strain and has the potential to develop into a major pandemic. Already, the virus has infected more than 150 people in Mexico and has spread to New York City and other parts of the United States.

Evaluating the Obama administration's national security budget and planning process

Gordon Adams — Tue, 28 Apr 2009 15:15:59 -0700

In its first 100 days, the Obama administration has had to confront a series of pressing foreign policy and national security issues--North Korean missile launches, a revamping of the war strategy in Afghanistan, the Taliban's continued rise in Pakistan, and, of course, the Iranian nuclear program. As with all new administrations, the issues have come faster than the Obama administration can cope with them. Thus, improvisation has been a major feature of the administration's response--especially with only part of the team in place.

Why Thomas Friedman is wrong about the National Ignition Facility

Hugh Gusterson — Mon, 27 Apr 2009 09:31:28 -0700

Tom Friedman's brain is flat. That is the only conclusion I can reach after reading his New York Times piece on Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's National Ignition Facility (NIF). A flat brain cannot tolerate complexity. It turns things--such as globalization and laser facilities--into cartoon versions of themselves.

Bioethicists enter the dual-use debate

Malcolm Dando — Mon, 20 Apr 2009 09:00:42 -0700

Well-informed scientists disagree about whether classic dual-use experiments, such as the genetic manipulation of mouse pox and the sequencing and synthesis of 1918 Spanish Influenza, should have been carried out and/or published. Given this acrimony, an ethical analysis might help as the revolution in the life sciences continues apace. Bioethicists, who have not yet engaged much with the dual-use problem in the life science community, are beginning to apply their expertise to these questions, and the early results suggest that easy answers are still lacking.

Licensing life science researchers

Laura H. Kahn — Mon, 06 Apr 2009 08:36:39 -0700

In a previous column, I discussed how the recent U.S. buildup of high-containment biodefense laboratories might inadvertently increase the risk of another bioterrorist attack by increasing the number of researchers who have expertise and access to dangerous pathogens. One response to this risk has been to oversee research facilities and monitor the acquisition of microbes.

Reaction to the Obama-Medvedev joint statement on arms control

Pavel Podvig — Fri, 03 Apr 2009 08:33:26 -0700

For Russia, dialogue with the United States has always been as much about style as substance. So it isn't surprising that the change of tone brought by the Obama administration has produced encouraging results for nuclear arms control. The joint statement by U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev is hardly groundbreaking, but it does contain a few remarkable points.

The Washington Post's distorted take on Yucca Mountain

Hugh Gusterson — Fri, 27 Mar 2009 06:02:12 -0700

Newspapers maintain a distinction between news stories, which are supposed to be balanced and factually accurate, and editorial pages, which afford more license for point of view and factual cherry-picking. But there is still a line between responsible and irresponsible editorials. Wherever that line is, a recent Washington Post editorial on Yucca Mountain in Nevada is on the wrong side of it.

Biotechnology's crossroads

Malcolm Dando — Tue, 24 Mar 2009 08:37:36 -0700

Starting in the early part of this millennium, scientists and analysts forecast that advances in biotechnology and the rush to develop biodefenses were likely to lead to the development of a range of new biological weapons that defenses wouldn't be able to keep up with. Nearly 10 years later, the likelihood of these trends has not diminished, yet it is not too late to discourage the hostile exploitation of biotechnology.

Obama's first budget test

Gordon Adams — Tue, 17 Mar 2009 15:32:47 -0700

During his campaign, President Barack Obama promised to end funding national security programs, including the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, through emergency budget requests. He was especially critical of supplemental requests for programs and activities unrelated to Iraq or Afghanistan or that clearly belonged in the regular defense and foreign affairs budgets.

Empire of bases

Hugh Gusterson — Tue, 10 Mar 2009 08:38:30 -0700

Before reading this article, try to answer this question: How many military bases does the United States have in other countries: a) 100; b) 300; c) 700; or d) 1,000.

The risks of the "pathogen research enterprise"

Malcolm Dando — Wed, 04 Mar 2009 09:01:21 -0800

In one of his wonderfully funny children's books, Richard Scarry turned the idea of the clever fox on its head with his foxy character Mr. Fixit. Mr. Fixit is the repairman from hell, who wrecks everything he is called upon to repair. Rather unkindly perhaps, it was Mr. Fixit who appeared in my mind when I first heard that earlier this month the U.S. Army had stopped work at its Fort Detrick biodefense laboratories until it carried out an audit of what materials were in the labs. In expanding its research to protect against a perceived increase in the threat of bioterrorism, had the U.S.