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Nuclear pursuits, 2012

By Robert S. Norris, Hans M. Kristensen
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Fissile Materials Working Group

Involuntary response

The second Nuclear Security Summit needs a real plan to secure nuclear materials worldwide -- rather than relying on voluntary efforts and nonbinding, unchecked agreements.

Radiological materials and the Nuclear Security Summit

Many fear expanding the 2012 summit agenda to include radiological security will dilute its nuclear focus. But dangerous radioactive materials -- often far less secure and far more accessible than nuclear materials -- need all the attention they can get.

Why the Conference on Disarmament still matters

Reconciling interests in the CD may be a frustrating exercise, but it is necessary if we are to design enforceable global nonproliferation and disarmament treaties.

Libya, Belarus, and dealing with dictators

Recent events have shown that working with mercurial dictators is still a lot safer than ignoring them.

Two treaties. One Congress. No time to wait.

Congress has a chance to take real steps to reduce the risks of nuclear terrorism -- if only they would act.

Regime change for nuclear security

It is time for the nuclear security structure to be reconceptualized to emphasize consensus, efficiency, and the reality of global nuclear threats to all nations.

Chinese nuclear security practices

A behind-the-scenes look at one of the largest nuclear systems in the world.

Nuclear materials security: Cooperation is key

A truly collaborative international approach is essential to improving nuclear security worldwide and reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism.

After bin Laden: Nuclear terrorism still a top threat

Osama bin Laden is gone, but the threat of nuclear terrorism remains. To improve security, the United States must support efforts to eliminate and secure nuclear materials worldwide.

Promises, promises: A progress report one year after the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit

Last year 47 nations gathered in Washington, DC, to support improvements in international security. Their promises were not empty. One year later, these countries have made significant progress toward improving the security of vulnerable nuclear material around the world.

Congress's nuclear terrorism shortfall

If authorized funding is not appropriated for 2011 in the upcoming funding bill, efforts to improve global nuclear material security will stall and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative will be the biggest loser.

Setback for WMD security

G-8 leaders' failure to renew WMD program puts the world at risk.

What is nuclear security worth in 2011?

The U.S. is the linchpin in international security efforts, and key nuclear security programs need strong congressional support.

Strengthening nuclear security: The legal agenda

Such an agenda doesn't require that international law be rewritten, it merely needs to make sure that the existing legal structures are adhered to more stringently.

Deconstructing U.S. funding for nuclear material security

President Obama's spending requests to fulfill his promise of securing all of the world's vulnerable nuclear material within the next four years haven't been nearly as ambitious as his rhetoric.

Prioritizing investment in nuclear security education

The importance of nuclear security is hard to deny, yet there are few training programs for those who wish to follow this career path--a situation that must change.

This is the year for nuclear material security

Between President Obama's upcoming Nuclear Security Summit and the May NPT Review Conference, 2010 provides some good opportunities to build international support for better safeguarding the world's vulnerable fissile material.

Reduce the civilian use of HEU now

Many countries continue to use highly enriched uranium in their civilian research reactors and medical isotope production. This dangerous material should be quickly replaced with safer low-enriched uranium.

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Profile

Fissile Materials Working Group

The Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG) brings together the experience of leading nonproliferation experts and nongovernmental organizations to support President Barack Obama's vision of "securing all nuclear weapon materials at vulnerable sites within four years." Specifically, working group members collaborate in a series of meetings to create consensus around fissile material control priorities, develop actionable policy proposals, and package recommendations for implementation by Obama administration officials. FMWG members who will contribute to this column include Irma Arguello, David Culp, Ingrid Drake, Rob Golan-Vilella, Li Hong, Kenneth Luongo, Michelle Marchesano, Rajiv Nayan, Miles Pomper, William Potter, Kingston Reif, Jennifer Smyser, Elena Sokova, Peter Stockton, Alexandra Toma, Paul Walker, Peter Wilk, and Sarah Williams.

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