On our website, we have compiled numerous resources for interested parties to familiarize themselves with the actors, initiatives, and current guidance that make up today's fissile material security framework. These are both official documents and policy critiques by our member network. In total, the resources help readers better understand how the nuclear security pieces fit together and how nuclear security can be improved to better protect against twenty-first century threats. Below, we have assembled a list of some of the absolute must reads included on our resources page.
In his presentation, Bunn, an associate professor at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government and Steering Committee member of the Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG), analyzes the implications of the fiscal year 2011 budget request on President Barack Obama's goal to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within four years.
Each year, Bunn outlines the danger nuclear terrorism presents, assesses what has and has not been done to reduce it, and suggests an agenda of actions that could reduce the risk dramatically. This is his most recent installment.
This working paper contends that current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are incapable of ensuring timely warning of a diversion of materials or technology from civil uranium enrichment plants. To begin addressing directly the international security concerns that accompany continued national acquisition of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities, the authors propose a major enhancement of current IAEA safeguards on enrichment plants.
In this article, Luongo, the co-chair of the FMWG, explains how the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington is an extremely important opportunity to advance global nuclear security. He proposes that the summit can define twenty-first century nuclear security standards and initiatives that are desperately needed to supplement Cold War nuclear security norms. Among the new initiatives he proposes are developing a global fissile material security framework agreement; coordinating the actions needed to secure vulnerable nuclear materials from terrorist attack; strengthening the IAEA by increasing its funding for nuclear security; consolidating and eliminating global highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium stockpiles; and phasing out the use of HEU in civilian programs.
Turpen, a nuclear security expert formerly of the Henry L. Stimson Center and now at Booz Allen Hamilton, authored this working paper to prompt discussion on the goals, practical accomplishments, and key concerns related to multilateral instruments and initiatives needed to further nuclear security.
The FMWG involves many different individuals and organizations that have many issues and ideas that they want to analyze and promote. However, a principle goal of the working group is to generate consensus in support of several policy priorities that all of its members agree the Obama administration should pursue. The following are the top five consensus policy proposals the FMWG is seeking from the administration.
There is broad, bipartisan consensus that we must prevent nuclear terrorism at home by securing all vulnerable nuclear materials around the globe as quickly as possible. The FMWG sent this letter to Congress in support of the fissile material security funding requested in President Obama's fiscal year 2011 budget. An additional $320 million over the fiscal year 2010 budget was included in next year's budget request to support the four-year international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide.
The documents in this series include guidance on nuclear security issues related to preventing, detecting, and responding to theft, sabotage, illegal transfers, and other malicious acts involving fissile materials and related facilities. All guidance is voluntary.
The International Panel on Fissile Materials was founded in January 2006 and is an independent group of arms control and nonproliferation experts from both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. The group's Global Fissile Material Report 2009 focuses on nuclear disarmament as seen through the lens of fissile material policy. It includes an examination of the plutonium and highly enriched uranium used in nuclear weapon complexes, power reactors, submarines, and research reactors.