Despite some criticism, opponents of biological and chemical weapons recognize the opportunity for increased weapons control that lies in the next two meetings of ICC Member States.
Few policy makers can say they are familiar with the intricate connections between biology and security. But two recent publications point the way toward refocusing policy on this important relationship.
Civil society can play an important role in the discourse that will define the Biological Weapons Convention into the future. But action must start now if there is to be meaningful change.
It's time to give credit where credit's due. A Westminster report shows British MPs are looking closely at their government's biosecurity policies.
Although the BWC lacks an enforcement mechanism, for the moment it's the most efficient way of reconciling the best and worst of biotechnology.
A new report by a prominent U.S. biosecurity group presents a strategy for getting the word out on dual-use life science research. Will the world follow?
Two recent papers suggest that U.S. security and U.S. biomedical science could benefit from the complex assessment that the systems analysis approach provides.
Two recent bioethical studies assess current efforts to prevent the misuse of the life sciences and suggest alternatives.
Despite a number of dire assessments, advances in biotechnology don't have to lead to a bioweapons arms race.
Expanded biodefense research that lacks transparency compounds the risk that states will engage in biological arms races.
The arms control community needs to shed its bitterness about past efforts to reform the bioweapons regime and begin developing a new agenda for action.
Scientists need to keep the pressure on governments to ensure the development of national norms to protect the public from the misuse of life science research.
Multiple approaches are needed to ensure that life science research is not used for malicious purposes.
Talking about the need for scientists to be aware of dual-use potentials is one thing; ensuring that they are is the more important step.
Framework conventions are helping to guard against climate change and to protect biological diversity. Could one help prevent the misuse of the life sciences?
Can the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention be used to educate life scientists about the potential dangers of their research? Some NGOs think so.
In developing strategies to counter the misuse of life science research, European officials are failing to take basic realities into account.
Perhaps scientists need to see the life sciences' dual-use problem in more personal terms.