A sampling of what's available...
Analysis
Analysis - Nuclear Weapons
The defensive nature of China's "underground great wall"
Much evidence shows that China bases a portion of its small nuclear arsenal in a vast tunnel network to shield it from a first strike. A recent study contending the tunnels hide thousands of nuclear weapons is based on simplistic reasoning and rumor.
Nuclear scientists as assassination targets
It is unclear who is responsible for the targeted killings of Iranian nuclear scientists and engineers, but the attacks raise unique policy questions about motives, effectiveness, repercussions, and legal and moral standards.
North Korea from 30,000 feet
Looking at leadership change and possible future trajectories of North Korea's nuclear program.
Restructuring defense R&D
How to spur innovation and reduce waste.
How the reset was upset
Russia has several legitimate concerns with NATO missile defense -- dismissing them is short-sighted and dangerous.
The Black Sea: Center of the nuclear black market
The Black Sea region is the center of the world's nuclear black market, and criminal organizations have become involved in nuclear trafficking. International coordination and law enforcement must be improved to prevent these organizations from working with terrorist groups.
The legacy of Reykjavik and the future of nuclear disarmament
Twenty-five years ago in Reykjavik, Iceland, US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev walked to the threshold of a nuclear-free world -- and then turned back. The authors compare and contrast the geopolitical and diplomatic contexts of 1986 with today.
International humanitarian law and nuclear weapons: Irreconcilable differences
In 1996, the International Court of Justice issued an opinion that the use of nuclear weapons is "scarcely reconcilable" with international humanitarian law. And when the rules of war are applied, it becomes clear that these weapons cannot comply with international law.
Politics, bureaucracy, and the proliferation of nuclear knowledge
In an excerpt from her book, Our Own Worst Enemy? Institutional Interests and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Expertise, an American University professor explains how the US strategy of discouraging proliferation through job creation for former Soviet weapons scientists failed.
Chain reaction: How the media has misread the IAEA's report on Iran
Pundits and politicians who use the latest IAEA report to attack the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate are distorting the information, at best -- and, at worst, are playing politics with national security.
Seyed Hossein Mousavian: The West is pushing Iran in the wrong direction
In an exclusive interview, a former key adviser to top Iranian leaders says negotiation can ease the West’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program – but only if Washington and Tehran also talk directly about the other issues that divide them.
Fatwas for fission: Assessing the terrorist threat to Pakistan's nuclear assets
Pakistan's nuclear assets may be tempting targets for terrorists. Experts are split, however, on the actual threat posed. The author writes that the real threat assessment is yet to be made -- one that goes beyond merely considering assumed terrorist capability and putative vulnerabilities.
Who's a weapons scientist?
A Russian expert reportedly provided the Iranian nuclear program with important technical know-how. The US has tried hard to stop knowledge proliferation but had difficulty identifying scientists with critical weapons skills.
Coming not so soon to a theater near you: Laser weapons for missile defense
The Airborne Laser was to be a dream antimissile weapon. What it became was a classic defense boondoggle and a frightening example of how committed military officials, scientists, and defense contractors can persuade Congress to keep a defense program alive against, seemingly, all reason.
A multinational fuel consortium: Obstacles, options, and ways forward
While there has been progress in the establishment of low-enriched uranium banks, many obstacles remain. Unless decisive actions are taken now, several states could be a political decision away from acquiring nuclear weapons capability.
Moving to passive designs
Rosner, Lordan, and Goldberg explore the proposition that a transition to increasingly passive safety features in new advanced reactor designs could significantly reduce reactor safety risks.
What next: A Sunni bomb?
If Iran gets a nuclear bomb, Saudi Arabia will likely try to follow, turning to Pakistan, its longtime Sunni ally, for technological help.
How to avoid a new arms race
A guide to NATO-Russia cooperation on missile defense.