Brazil: Why go nuclear?

Editor's note: In the September/October 2008 Bulletin, we asked governments from countries around the world to explain why they were considering nuclear power. That dialogue continues below, as the chairman of Brazil's nuclear energy commission explains his country's nuclear energy plans.

Brazil has conducted research in the nuclear sciences since just after World War II, when the whole world was excited about the potential of nuclear energy. In the early 1950s, Brazil had an amazing team of scientists who helped create the framework ensuring international access to the new nuclear discoveries together with a commitment to nonproliferation. Brazil's first research reactor, the first such reactor in South America, began operating in 1958. In 1971, a contract for a 630-megawatt nuclear power plant was signed with Westinghouse. Known as Angra 1, it was finished in 1986.

In 1975, Brazil signed a broad program of cooperation with West Germany to build eight 1,300-megawatt nuclear power plants that were to be located at sites around the country. The program was never completed and only one reactor, Angra 2, was brought online--construction began in 1995. Most of the equipment for a third nuclear power reactor has been kept in storage, which costs the Brazilian government $20 million annually. An ironic positive side effect is that Brazil has developed an expertise in the storage of highly technical equipment.

During the 1980s and most of the 1990s, as in other areas of the world, Brazil decided to slow down its nuclear program, reducing the scope of the German nuclear agreement to just maintenance and supply. As such, the government decreased its financial support for the nuclear program and slowed the construction of Angra 2, which wasn't completed until 2002.

With little to do, no new staff was hired at nuclear institutions. Those who remained, especially scientists and senior engineers, began to leave, taking their skills to other fields such as materials science and nuclear fusion. The average age of Brazilian nuclear workers is now 54; however, they are prepared for the prospect of a resurgent Brazilian nuclear program.

In 2003, at the beginning of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's government, it was clear to policy makers that a decision about the equipment in storage was necessary. The heads of the Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN), Eletronuclear (operator of Angra 2), Indústrias Nucleares Brasileiras (responsible for mining, enrichment, and fuel assembly), and the Navy Technical Center (owner of the country's enrichment centrifuge technology) proposed a broad new nuclear program. The program was guided by the recognition that Brazil had the human resources, the necessary knowledge, and the sixth-largest uranium reserves in the world (only 30 percent of Brazil's territory has so far been prospected).

The discussion that followed was quite productive and informative. It involved several ministries and received significant coverage in the national media. The consequence was that in 2007 the government announced the construction of Angra 3 (to be completed by 2014), and a newspaper public opinion poll taken at the time indicated 65 percent approval.

At the beginning of 2008--after three years of debate--a committee of 11 cabinet ministers was formed to ensure the success and coordination between the different institutions responsible for the program's completion. The Brazilian nuclear program is now considered a strategic national plan, instead of just a government project. The expected action plans are being finalized and aim to:

• Increase the nuclear energy share of Brazil's electric-generating capacity. A study undertaken by the Energy Research Enterprise, part of the Ministry of Mines and Energy, proposed that aside from Angra 3, four to eight new 1,000-megawatt nuclear power plants should be built by 2030, increasing nuclear generation from 2.5 percent to 5­-6 percent of the country's generating capacity.
• Ensure self-sufficiency in the production of nuclear fuel, providing 100 percent of the country's demand. This requires searching for new uranium deposits, expanding both mining activities and the enrichment plant at Resende in São Paulo, and enlarging the fuel assembly complex. Brazil is one of only three countries--the United States and Russia are the others--that has both large deposits of uranium and the technology to process and enrich it.
• Invest in all applications of nuclear energy and medical, industrial, and agricultural activities that use ionizing radiation, such as radiopharmaceutical production and building high-dose irradiators.
• Strengthen regulations and create a new regulatory agency, separate from CNEN.
• Develop a broad and consistent educational and training program, joining the universities and the research institutes of CNEN and the Ministry of Science and Technology, to address all areas of the Brazilian nuclear program, followed by a strategy of hiring highly skilled personnel to face any challenges.

All of these initiatives will require the revision of pertinent laws, which is already underway, while maintaining Brazil's international commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In its 1988 constitution, Brazil established that its nuclear activities must be devoted solely to peaceful use. Brazil is also subject to three independent safeguards systems--CNEN (the national regulatory body), the Brazilian-Argentine Accounting and Control Agency, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, thus satisfying the requirements of the NPT.

The Brazilian government is convinced that its plan to expand nuclear power is feasible and mature. The country's nuclear scientists, engineers, technicians, and operators are all determined to participate in its implementation and to ensure its success.