Reflections on the life and accomplishments of Jonathan B. Tucker, 1954-2011.
Yet again, the WMD Commission has given Washington a failing grade on its preparations to prevent bioterrorism. But the commission's concerns are misplaced.
Now more than ever, the BWC has the potential to become an inclusive, interactive community of public and private interests, governments, NGOs, and academics.
Proponents of nuclear disarmament should look no further than the effort to rid the world of chemical weapons for confirmation that their goals are achievable.
Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. government tested the effects of radiation and mind-control drugs on unsuspecting Americans. Think we've come a long way since then? Think again.
The U.S. Army should reconsider proposed changes to destruction efforts of chemical weapons in order to bolster Washington's reputation internationally.
The focus of biosecurity should be limited to the prevention of the misuse of life science research for terrorist aims.
Congress should balance biosecurity demands with the need to develop vaccines and medicines to treat the diseases caused by select agents.
The investigation of the 2001 anthrax mailings demonstrates that the United States has a long way to go before it's capable of preventing a bioterrorist attack.
The global plan for containing laboratory samples of poliovirus could hold the keys to securing a range of dangerous bacteria and viruses.
In the places around the globe where new diseases are most likely to emerge, the infrastructure to detect outbreaks is severely lacking.
When re-upping nanotech R&D funding, Congress should account for the positive impact sound risk and safety assessments would have on the field and the public.